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Abstract
Responding to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the US Congress in 2010 passed the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, thereby altering the playbook for how banks
and other financial institutions must manage their risks and report their activities. The European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has similarly been working diligently to overhaul the
regulatory environment for insurers and pension managers, as well as the more traditional financial sector
players such as banks. The implosion of the financial sector also prompted calls for change to the accounting
system from many seeking to better understand how assets and liabilities are reported. While initially banks
were seen by many as the most important focus for regulatory reform in the wake of the 2008–09 financial
meltdown, other institutions are now attracting policymakers’ purview and reform efforts. The new rules are
having both direct and spillover effects on retirement systems around the world, including pensions and
insurers. The first half of this volume undertakes an assessment of how global responses to the financial crisis
are potentially altering how insurers, pension plan sponsors, and policymakers will manage risk in the decades
to come. The second half evaluates developments in retirement saving and retirement products, to determine
which and how these might help meet shortfalls in retirement provision.
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/73
Implications of the New Regulatory Order 
for Retirement System Risk Management 
Olivia S. Mitchell, Raimond Maurer, and J. Michael Orszag 
August 2015 
PRC WP2015-13 
Pension Research Council Working Paper 
Pension Research Council 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 
Tel.: 215.898.7620 Fax: 215.573.3418 
Email: prc@wharton.upenn.edu 
http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org 
All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper represent the views of the authors and not those of the 
Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. © 2015 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved.  




Responding to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the US Congress in 2010 
passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, thereby altering the 
playbook for how banks and other financial institutions must manage their risks and report their 
activities. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has similarly 
been working diligently to overhaul the regulatory environment for insurers and pension 
managers, as well as the more traditional financial sector players such as banks. The implosion 
of the financial sector also prompted calls for change to the accounting system from many 
seeking to better understand how assets and liabilities are reported. While initially banks were 
seen by many as the most important focus for regulatory reform in the wake of the 2008–09 
financial meltdown, other institutions are now attracting policymakers’ purview and reform 
efforts. The new rules are having both direct and spillover effects on retirement systems around 
the world, including pensions and insurers. The first half of this volume undertakes an 
assessment of how global responses to the financial crisis are potentially altering how insurers, 
pension plan sponsors, and policymakers will manage risk in the decades to come. The second 
half evaluates developments in retirement saving and retirement products, to determine which 
and how these might help meet shortfalls in retirement provision. 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
and NBER 
3620 Locust Walk, Suite 3000 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
Email: mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu  
 
Raimond Maurer 
House of Finance 
Goethe University Frankfurt 
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 1 














Implications of the New Regulatory Order  
for Retirement System Risk Management 
 
Responding to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the US Congress in 
2010 passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, thereby altering 
the playbook for how banks and other financial institutions must manage their risks and report 
their activities. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has 
similarly been working diligently to overhaul the regulatory environment for insurers and 
pension managers, as well as the more traditional financial sector players such as banks. The 
implosion of the financial sector also prompted calls for change to the accounting system from 
many seeking to better understand how assets and liabilities are reported.  
While initially banks were seen by many as the most important focus for regulatory 
reform in the wake of the 2008–09 financial meltdown, other institutions are now attracting 
policymakers’ purview and reform efforts. On the one hand, there is a logic to this in terms of 
managing systemic risk and ensuring a level playing field that avoids arbitrage between 
institutional structures. On the other hand, the nature of life insurance and pension liabilities is so 
different from those of bank liabilities that careful attention is needed in drafting appropriate 
rules. The new rules are having both direct and spillover effects on retirement systems around the 
world, including pensions and insurers. The first half of this volume undertakes an assessment of 
how global responses to the financial crisis are potentially altering how insurers, pension plan 
sponsors, and policymakers will manage risk in the decades to come. The second half evaluates 
developments in retirement saving and retirement products, to determine which and how these 
might help meet shortfalls in retirement provision.  
 
Global Risk Assessment for Pensions and Annuities  
2 
Understanding how national, regional, and local regulations are changing post-financial 
crisis requires an assessment of the supervisory and regulatory environment for retirement 
systems and insurers. In his chapter, Peter Fisher (2016) takes on this task along with an 
examination of the effects of supervisory changes on market structure, conduct, and 
performance. In most cases, the supervisory structures overseeing insurance and pensions are 
complex and relatively untested. For instance in the US and Canada, supervisors are mainly 
state-based, augmented by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
Federal actors have also recently entered the field, including the US Federal Reserve which now 
supervises insurance companies representing about one-third of US insurance industry assets; the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). These regulators influence private-sector activity mainly by establishing requirements to 
achieve policy objectives including financial stability and enhanced consumer welfare.  
Nevertheless these policies often involve tradeoffs and have unintended effects on other 
markets and segments of the economy as well. For example, to ensure financial stability, some 
countries require global insurers to maintain elevated levels of capital, often at the subsidiary 
level within the country administering the measures. This reduces capital mobility across 
national borders. The lack of coordination across geographic markets may lead to capital 
inefficiencies, and higher operating costs can lead to higher product prices and potentially 
reduced competition as firms withdraw from certain markets. Moreover, while regulators could 
curtail market risks for investors, this could exacerbate the impact of other factors including 
longevity risk. 
Life insurance companies are also coming under more scrutiny in the wake of the 
financial crisis, in part because they have traditionally used accounting techniques that smooth 
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changes in values of firm assets and liabilities. By doing so, they transfer surpluses in good years 
to cover benefit payouts in bad years. On the one hand, some criticize such techniques for 
making it difficult to assess insurers’ true financial status as such approaches most frequently use 
discretion rather than fixed rules, leaving them open to possible manipulation. Smoothing 
permits losses to be deferred, but when assets must be sold to pay the benefits—and losses must 
be realized—large reductions in benefit payments may be triggered and firm solvency may be 
challenged. On the other hand, opponents of fair market value (FMV) reporting contend that 
mark-to-market (MTM) reporting is misleading for assets held to maturity, may not be reliable if 
based on model prices, and could lead to undesirable firm actions. But smoothing also defers 
gains, and when the gains are realized, benefits can increase due to the larger value of the 
contingency reserve.  
In their chapter on this topic, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, and 
Ivonne Siegelin (2016) show that smoothing can actually add value to both annuitants and 
insurers. This means that curtailing smoothing might undermine the market for long-term 
retirement payout products. The particular product the authors examine is the participating 
payout life annuity (PLA). To illustrate how payout smoothing works, the authors construct a 
stylized model of a life insurer selling single premium participating life annuity contracts. These 
are patterned after the TIAA Traditional Annuity offered by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF). This product provides retirees 
with lifetime guaranteed benefits plus non-guaranteed surplus payments. The authors conclude 
that accounting smoothing in the PLA context values assets at historical cost rather than at fair 
market value, and the practice helps to shield insurer balance sheets and income statements 
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against capital market volatility. Surpluses shared with policyholders are conventionally 
computed using realized gains and losses. 
Turning to mark-to-market accounting for corporate defined benefit pensions, the chapter 
by Joseph Busillo, Thomas Harvey, and Bryan Hoffman (2016) notes that most plan sponsors 
utilize Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for their pension plan valuation. 
These shield the plan from market fluctuations, which can be sensible in stable markets. Yet in a 
crisis such as the 2008–09 event, many plans lost money and ended up with a large pool of 
unamortized losses that had to be recognized over time. The mark-to-mark approach by contrast 
exposes the balance sheet and income statement to real-world volatility. In practice, many equity 
analysts and rating agencies ‘unwind’ the pension funds’ status in comparative calculations. In 
fact, a study examining share price movements over a five-day period surrounding the 
announcement of an accounting change to MTM indicated that companies experienced no 
statistically significant changes in share prices as a result. Moreover, companies adopting 
pension MTM have not tended to alter their pension asset mix in response, for the most part 
remaining with a traditional mix of 60/40 equities/fixed-income strategies. This is similar to that 
followed by corporate pension plans utilizing traditional GAAP pension accounting methods.   
 Risk disclosure in the insurance context is the subject of Karel Van Hulle’s (2016) 
chapter, where he discusses the evolution of European policy starting with the Solvency I 
regulatory regime developed during the 1970s. He argues that there was little incentive for 
insurers to be risk sensitive in those days, whereas Solvency II rules under development will 
require harmonized insurer information available at the EU-wide level. Nevertheless, 
occupational pension funds will still not be required to provide information to the public at large 
about the risks they bear. Hence though transparency in the insurance sector will be enhanced, he 
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concludes that there is still no level playing field between highly regulated insurers and pension 
funds subject to less disclosure. What remains to be done is to better align systemic risk 
management with better reporting and regulation, and to more carefully assess whether pension 
funds should, and could, be held to the same standards as are insurers.  
One concern voiced by many in the pensions field today is that regulators may be 
sweeping the proverbial baby, pensions and insurers, out with the bathwater, namely the poorly-
performing banks that brought the financial system to near-ruin. In their chapter, Brian Reid and 
Dan Waters (2016) describe what systemic risk is, how bank-oriented models and rules have 
influenced thinking about systemic risk, and how this thinking has affected the subsequent 
regulatory focus on pensions as well as the funds and products in which they invest. They also 
question current theories of how asset management products could pose risks to the financial 
system. 
As the authors note, the US Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has been 
established to identify threats to financial stability and promote market discipline. In Europe, the 
European Parliament created the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to coordinate and 
oversee risks within the European Union. Internationally, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has 
taken on the role of identifying sources of global systemic risk. Some studies exploring the 
connections between banks and nonbank financial institutions drew parallels between bank and 
nonbank intermediated credit, and thus some in the literature began referring to nonbanks as 
‘shadow banks’ and their activities as ‘shadow banking.’  
Nevertheless, the authors disagree with this view because they argue that capital market 
financial intermediation is fundamentally different from bank-based financing. Banks normally 
finance their investments by issuing short and medium-term debt and deposits, which create a 
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fixed set of claims on banks. At the same time, banks hold portfolios of loans and marketable 
securities, which values rise and fall over time. This can create a mismatch driving the need to 
hold capital to help protect bank depositors and creditors from losses. Banks’ heavy reliance on 
debt to finance their balance sheets magnifies the effects on their capital when asset prices 
change. Among the largest US banks, the average balance sheet leverage ratio is 9:1. If asset 
prices fall and depositors pull money out, banks may have to quickly dispose of their assets, 
spurring a downward cycle. By comparison, asset managers deliver services through publicly or 
privately offered funds and do not own the underlying assets nor do they promise a set rate of 
return. Therefore asset managers and the products and services they provide are structurally 
different from those provided by banks, and they should therefore be regulated differently. 
Regulators have expressed concern that some fund structures, namely those that buy back 
an investor’s shares on a daily basis, could confer a ‘first mover advantage’ on fast-moving 
investors, potentially posing systemic risk. For instance if investors redeemed their bond funds 
during a period of financial market stress, the funds might not be able to sell their assets to meet 
these orders, or their actions could cause prices in the bond markets to fall sharply. Yet US fund 
managers are required to mark their funds’ portfolios to market on a daily basis, using forward 
pricing and fair valuation methods to avoid predictable price movements. Using a bid- or mid-
price passes some of the trading costs along to the investor leaving the fund because this pricing 
method values the shares near to what the fund would receive if it needed to sell assets to 
accommodate the redemption. Another way that funds manage costs is by imposing redemption 
fees on investors who leave a fund within a certain window of time after investing in the fund. In 
addition, most funds also reserve the right to redeem shares in kind if investors with particularly 
large trades want to quickly redeem their shares, so that rather than receiving cash the investor is 
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paid with a slice of securities. Pooled products such as mutual funds or collective investment 
funds often have the option to redeem in-kind if the retirement plan sponsor has not given 
sufficient warning that it is removing the plan from the fund. Yet global regulators seem to be 
close to designating asset managers and their funds, possibly including large pension funds, as 
global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).  If the FSOC were to designate some 
set of US funds or asset managers as SIFIs, this could cause a small group of funds and their 
investors, including pension plan participants, to bear significant costs. 
 
Developments in Retirement Saving and Retirement Products    
 The second portion of this volume turns to an examination of where and how people save for 
old age, whether they are saving enough, and whether new risk management approaches as well 
as investment vehicles might enhance retirement saving efforts. 
  The chapter by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Leora Klapper, and Georgios A. Panos (2016) 
discusses global patterns of saving for old age using an invaluable new dataset, the World Bank’s 
Global Findex. This includes information from many thousands of individuals interviewed 
around the world, providing a new set of insights into the individual and country-level factors 
associated with old-age asset accumulation.  One of the useful aspects of this survey is that it 
asked about ‘unbanked’ persons, or those who save outside the formal banking system. The 
chapter shows that people report saving mainly for old age, education, or to a start a business, 
and globally, about 25 percent say they are saving for old age. This rate rises to about 40 percent 
in high-income OECD countries and the Asia Pacific region, though it is lower in poorer 
economies. There is also some difference in saving propensities by gender, in that men tend to 
save more as do the better educated. Financial inclusion is also strongly and usually positively 
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correlated with old-age saving. Finally, the authors find little evidence for public/private ‘crowd-
out,’ in that the probability of people saying they save for old age privately is not significantly 
associated with the existence or generosity of pensions. 
  The next chapter, by Andrew Biggs (2016), examines new ways to think about old-age 
retirement system payouts. Financial advisors and policymakers often use the term ‘replacement 
rate’ to judge the adequacy of peoples’ retirement savings, where the term refers to a comparison 
of anticipated retirement income benefits to pre-retirement earnings. As a summary statistic 
though, the replacement rate notion has a myriad of calculation and interpretational attributes 
implying it can have profound implications for policy as well as individual outcomes and 
decisions. This chapter takes up three key questions: (1) should policymakers use replacement 
rates based on stylized workers, or should they use administrative or microsimulation data; (2) 
should the denominator of the replacement rate calculation – pre-retirement earnings – be 
adjusted for the growth of prices or the growth of economy-wide wages; and (3) should 
replacement rates incorporate family-size adjustments to account for how having children affects 
parents’ need to save for retirement?  
The impact of these methodological choices is illustrated using a microsimulation model 
of Social Security benefits and employer-sponsored pensions. The author concludes that much of 
the disagreement over whether Americans face a ‘retirement crisis’ stems not from 
disagreements over how much retirement income American retirees will have, but from how 
much income they will need.  Biggs argues that a replacement rate of 100 percent is unnecessary, 
since retirees pay lower taxes and have fewer work-related costs. Moreover, many have paid off 
their mortgages and completed their retirement saving.  The author points out that taking these 
9 
factors into account greatly reduces measured estimates of those likely to experience shortfalls in 
retirement.   
 Managing retirement risk is also taken up by coauthors Montserrat Guillen, Catherine 
Donnelly, and Jens Perch Nielsen (2016) in their chapter analyzing strategies for an investor with 
a retirement saving plan. Previous research has found that fees paid for managing investment 
funds and for mitigating longevity risk substantially erode pensioners’ wealth. Moreover it can 
be difficult to communicate the concept of uncertainty to consumers. Their chapter, by contrast, 
offers a retirement investment approach with both an upper target which their wealth should not 
exceed, and a lower bound which their wealth must not fall below. Establishing upper and lower 
bounds on retirement wealth can help the returns of pension savers in the sense that managerial 
fees can be reduced while controlling risk.  
 In the final chapter by David Tuesta, Javier Alonso, and Alfonso Arellano (2016), the 
authors explore what shapes pension funds’ decisions to invest in infrastructure. Though 
financial regulators in many countries do allow pension funds to invest in infrastructure, 
relatively few do so. This is of interest given pension funds need to achieve better returns on 
investment (particularly in a low-interest rate environment). Accordingly, regulators must 
evaluate whether private pension funds should invest in infrastructure projects having a long 
term horizon that aligns with pension liability maturity dates. While countries differ with regard 
to financial investment regulations, the degree to which their capital markets allow such 
investments, and the pension fund’s technical capability to access direct or indirect infrastructure 
financing, the authors conclude that regulatory restrictions on pension funds to invest in 
infrastructure are less important than the institutional framework in which they operate.  
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Nevertheless, infrastructure investing is complex, requiring the alignment of many 
different stakeholder interests including shareholders, financial institutions, regulators, insurance 
companies, contractors, project operators, raw materials suppliers, and of course the end-users of 
the output.  Moreover, numerous risks characteristics of such huge projects include construction 
delays/cost overruns/technical failures, operational risks, financial market surprises, market 
fluctuations, and political challenges (e.g., expropriation, political turmoil, regulation). As 
infrastructure investment is not marked to market frequently and often involves large projects of 
political importance, it is also a source of significant governance concerns. In view of these, 
pension funds must develop deep expertise in these fields and make sure that their governance 
arrangements are sufficient for the complexity involved. Some countries such as Australia and 
Canada permit pension funds to invest with enormous flexibility, and there the pensions have 
apparently successfully invested intensively in infrastructure.   
 
Conclusions 
The global financial crisis had immediate and detrimental impacts on pension and 
insurance company assets intended to finance millions of peoples’ retirement. Since that time, 
regulators and policymakers have turned to increasingly-focused efforts to alter how pensions 
and insurers manage and report the risks they take on. In many cases, US and European 
regulators have been influenced by their views of how the banking system needed to be 
strengthened. Nevertheless, pensions and insurers differ in fundamental ways from banks, and 
this volume illustrates several ways in which retirement risk management should be conceived of 
differently from bank practice. 
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In sum, our assessment of regulatory responses to the financial crisis shows that the 
playing field is changing for insurers and pension plan sponsors. We also discuss developments 
in retirement saving and retirement products, to determine which and how these might help meet 
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